Claude summarizes Project 2025, Chapter 30, so you don’t have to.

Could you summarize the document “2025_Chapter30” for me?

Certainly. Here's a summary of the key points from the "2025_Chapter30" document on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC):

Summary of Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chapter

Mission and Overview

The FTC enforces antitrust laws and consumer protection regulations

Key laws: Sherman Act, Clayton Act, Federal Trade Commission Act

Recent debates on the purpose and scope of antitrust enforcement

Key Issues and Reforms

FTC's Existence and Structure

Debate over whether antitrust enforcement should be solely under DOJ

Questions about FTC's independence and constitutionality

ESG Practices and Antitrust

Concerns about ESG being used to cover anticompetitive behavior

Recommendation for Congress to investigate ESG practices

Cancel Culture and Commerce

Examining businesses refusing service based on political views

Potential for unfair trade practices in certain circumstances

Protecting Children Online

Concerns about social media's impact on children's mental health

Recommendations for stronger protections and parental consent requirements

Antitrust Enforcement

Suggestions for increased cooperation with state attorneys general

Debate over expanding regional FTC offices

Big Tech and Antitrust

Challenges in applying traditional antitrust theory to tech platforms

Need for more sophisticated analysis of consumer welfare in digital markets

Conclusion

Conservative approaches still trust markets over government

Recognition of new challenges posed by market concentration and tech platforms

Call for careful recalibration of antitrust and consumer protection enforcement

The chapter reflects ongoing debates within conservative circles about the appropriate role and scope of antitrust enforcement, particularly in the digital age.

This summary captures the main points of the chapter on the Federal Trade Commission, including its mission, key issues, and potential reforms from a conservative perspective. The chapter highlights ongoing debates within conservative circles about the appropriate role of antitrust enforcement, particularly in relation to big tech companies and new market dynamics.

What criticisms does this document have for the FTC?

The document presents several criticisms of the FTC from a conservative perspective. Here are the main criticisms highlighted:

Constitutional concerns: Some conservatives question the constitutionality of the FTC's structure, particularly its independence from presidential control. They argue that the commissioners not being removable at will by the President may violate the Constitution's Vesting Clause.
Outdated economic models: The document suggests that the FTC's traditional economic models and antitrust theories may be inadequate for dealing with modern tech companies and digital markets. It cites the FTC's 2013 decision not to sue Google as an example of how these models failed to predict market developments accurately.
Lack of action on Big Tech: The chapter implies that the FTC has been too hesitant to take significant antitrust action against large tech platforms, possibly due to outdated economic theories or political considerations.
Insufficient protection for children online: The document criticizes the FTC for not doing enough to protect children from harmful online practices, particularly in social media. It suggests that current regulations like COPPA (Children's Online Privacy Protection Act) are insufficient.
Centralization of power: Some conservatives argue that the FTC, as part of the broader administrative state, represents an undesirable centralization of power away from more democratically accountable institutions.
Lack of local focus: The document suggests that the FTC has become too centralized in Washington D.C., with diminished influence of its regional offices. This has potentially made the agency less responsive to local issues.
Possible political bias: While not explicitly stated, the document implies that the FTC's decisions may have been influenced by political considerations, particularly during the Obama administration's relationship with Silicon Valley.

These criticisms reflect a broader conservative skepticism about the role and effectiveness of government agencies in regulating markets, while also acknowledging new challenges posed by digital platforms and market concentration.

What are the questions the document raises regarding the FTC’s independence and constitutionality?

The document raises several important questions regarding the FTC’s independence and constitutionality. Let me summarize those for you:

1. Constitutional concerns about agency independence:
– The document points out that FTC commissioners are not removable at will by the President.
– Some conservatives argue this violates the Vesting Clause of Article II of the Constitution.
– This structure is seen as potentially unconstitutional because it limits the President’s control over executive branch functions.

2. Questioning the Humphrey’s Executor ruling:
– The document mentions the Supreme Court case Humphrey’s Executor, which upheld the constitutionality of independent agencies.
– It suggests that this ruling might be “ripe for revisiting,” indicating that some conservatives believe the legal basis for independent agencies like the FTC should be reconsidered.

3. Debate over enforcement authority:
– Some conservatives argue that antitrust enforcement should be solely invested in the Department of Justice (DOJ).
– This view stems from concerns about the FTC’s independence and its potential lack of direct accountability to the President.

4. Broader questions about the administrative state:
– The document reflects a conservative critique of the post-New Deal expansion of the administrative state.
– It suggests that the FTC’s structure and independence are part of a broader concern about unelected bureaucrats wielding significant power.

5. Potential for change:
– The document notes that the Supreme Court’s recent grant of certiorari in a case involving the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau could signal a major retreat from Humphrey’s Executor.
– This suggests that the constitutional status of independent agencies like the FTC might be subject to change in the near future.

These questions reflect a broader conservative skepticism about independent agencies and their place within the constitutional structure of the United States government. The document suggests that some conservatives view the FTC’s independence as problematic from both a constitutional and a policy perspective, preferring more direct executive control over regulatory and enforcement functions.

In what ways does US antitrust enforcement differ from the European Union?

The document mentions some differences between U.S. antitrust enforcement and that of the European Union. Let me summarize those points:

1. Regulatory approach:
– The document suggests that the EU has a “less friendly regulatory environment” compared to the US when it comes to tech companies.
– This implies that the EU takes a more aggressive or interventionist approach to antitrust enforcement, particularly in the tech sector.

2. Impact on innovation and business growth:
– The chapter notes that out of the top 10 global tech companies, the EU doesn’t have any, while the US claims eight.
– This is presented as a potential consequence of the EU’s more stringent antitrust enforcement, suggesting that it may hinder the growth of large tech companies.

3. Consumer welfare focus:
– While not explicitly comparing the US and EU approaches, the document emphasizes the US focus on consumer welfare as a key principle in antitrust enforcement.
– This suggests that US antitrust law may be more narrowly focused on consumer benefits (often measured in terms of prices and output) compared to the EU, which may consider a broader range of factors.

4. Approach to Big Tech:
– The document implies that the US has been more hesitant to take significant antitrust action against large tech platforms compared to the EU.
– However, it also notes that there’s an ongoing debate in the US about whether current antitrust approaches are adequate for dealing with modern tech companies.

While the document doesn’t provide an extensive comparison, it suggests that US antitrust enforcement has generally been less aggressive than the EU’s, particularly in the tech sector. However, it also indicates that there’s an ongoing debate in the US about whether this approach needs to change, especially in light of the growing power of big tech companies.

It’s worth noting that a more comprehensive comparison would likely reveal additional differences in areas such as merger control, remedies, and the specific legal frameworks used in each jurisdiction.

It sounds like the document itself is unclear as to the ways in which antitrust enforcement should be expanded, or even if it should be expanded at all. Is this true, and if so, could you present the arguments given in the document for both sides of that debate?

You’re absolutely correct. The document does indeed present a nuanced and somewhat conflicted view on whether and how antitrust enforcement should be expanded. Let me summarize the arguments presented for both sides of this debate:

Debate on Expanding Antitrust Enforcement

Arguments for Expanding Enforcement

Addressing new market dynamics:

Traditional economic models may be inadequate for understanding modern tech platforms and their market effects.

The document suggests that the FTC needs to become "more sophisticated in measuring consumer surplus" in digital markets.

Protecting democratic institutions:

Some conservatives argue that market concentration, especially in tech, can threaten free speech and democratic discourse.

There are concerns about collusion between large corporations and government, potentially undermining democratic institutions.

Protecting consumer welfare beyond price:

The document suggests considering factors beyond just price and output in assessing consumer welfare, such as the impact on happiness and mental well-being, particularly for children.

Addressing market concentration:

The document notes increasing evidence of growing monopoly rents and market concentration in the U.S. economy.

Combating "woke capitalism":

Some conservatives view expanded antitrust enforcement as a tool to combat perceived political bias in corporate America, especially regarding ESG and DEI initiatives.

Arguments Against Expanding Enforcement

Trust in market forces:

Many conservatives still believe that markets, not government, are best suited to give people what they want and need.

There's concern that overzealous enforcement could hinder innovation and economic growth.

Success of current approach:

The document notes that the U.S. has produced 8 of the top 10 global tech companies, suggesting current policies foster innovation.

It mentions that new competitors like Zoom have emerged, indicating that market forces are working.

Consumer satisfaction:

The document states that Americans report high levels of satisfaction with and trust in large tech companies.

Unintended consequences:

There's concern that stricter enforcement, like that seen in the EU, could stifle innovation and prevent the growth of successful companies.

Constitutional and philosophical concerns:

Some conservatives view expanded antitrust enforcement as an undesirable expansion of federal power.

There are concerns about the constitutionality of independent agencies like the FTC.

Conclusion

The document reflects an ongoing debate within conservative circles. While there's recognition of new challenges posed by market concentration and tech platforms, there's also hesitation about expanding government power. The document suggests that if changes are made, they should be careful and targeted, focusing on specific issues like protecting children online or preventing collusion between corporations and government.

This summary highlights the complexity of the debate presented in the document. It shows that conservatives are grappling with how to address new market realities while staying true to principles of limited government and free markets. The document doesn’t come to a clear conclusion, reflecting the ongoing nature of this debate within conservative circles.

Could you summarize traditional antitrust theory? What are the challenges to applying traditional antitrust theory to Big Tech?

Certainly. I’ll summarize traditional antitrust theory and then explain the challenges in applying it to Big Tech, based on the information provided in the document.

Traditional Antitrust Theory and Challenges with Big Tech

Traditional Antitrust Theory

Core Objective:

Assure a competitive economy that maximizes consumer welfare.

Key Principles:

Focus on allocative efficiency (optimal distribution of goods and services)

Emphasis on productive efficiency (least resources for optimal output)

Primary concern with consumer welfare, often measured through prices and output

Economic Models:

Based on modeling firm and consumer behavior as functions of price and output

Aimed at preventing monopolies and practices that reduce competition

Legal Framework:

Based on laws like the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and Federal Trade Commission Act

Prohibits practices like price fixing, unlawful mergers, and unfair methods of competition

Consumer Welfare Standard:

Focuses on benefits to consumers, often measured in terms of lower prices and increased output

Developed significantly through works like Robert Bork's "The Antitrust Paradox"

Challenges in Applying Traditional Theory to Big Tech

Different Business Models:

Many tech platforms offer free services, making it difficult to apply price-based analyses

Network effects and data accumulation create different competitive dynamics

Rapid Market Changes:

Tech markets evolve quickly, making it hard to gather long-term empirical evidence

Traditional economic predictions may not hold in fast-changing digital markets

Multi-Sided Platforms:

Many tech companies operate multi-sided platforms, complicating market definition and analysis

Traditional models may not fully capture the complexities of these business structures

Data as a Competitive Asset:

The role of data in creating competitive advantages is not easily accounted for in traditional models

Challenges in quantifying the value and competitive implications of data

Non-Price Effects:

Traditional theory focuses heavily on price effects, but tech companies often compete on other factors like quality, innovation, and privacy

Difficulty in measuring and comparing non-price effects on consumer welfare

Market Power Assessment:

Traditional indicators of market power may not apply well to tech companies

High market share doesn't always translate to market power in the same way for digital platforms

Innovation Considerations:

Balancing the promotion of innovation with concerns about market dominance is particularly challenging in the tech sector

Broader Societal Impacts:

Traditional theory may not adequately address concerns about tech companies' influence on democratic institutions, free speech, and mental health

The document suggests that these challenges call for a more nuanced and potentially expanded approach to antitrust enforcement in the tech sector, while also recognizing the risks of overzealous regulation that could stifle innovation and economic growth.

This summary outlines the key principles of traditional antitrust theory and highlights the specific challenges in applying this theory to Big Tech companies. The document emphasizes that while traditional antitrust theory has been effective in many areas, the unique characteristics of digital markets and tech platforms present new challenges that may require adjustments to antitrust approaches.

Now I ask an important question which I’m sure many of my dear readers may misinterpret or misunderstand. But the context of the question itself is very important.

To get at what I’m talking about, consider, for example, the classic antitrust approach to prices while applied to books. One way which we could achieve lower prices is if we were to shut out of the market place most authors, and only permit (say) five Amazon-approved book writers. The mass production of those writers would be very cost effective and we could in theory reduce the price of their books to damned near zero.

And that’s completely reasonable using a traditional antitrust analysis.

But consider: we’ve basically eliminated all the other voices out there! Authors are, within the context of the supply-demand curve, suppliers. But these authors are not currently considered using a classic antitrust argument, which is only concerned with the price of books, and not if there are a wide variety of authors for you to enjoy.

So which promotes consumer welfare more? A choice of authors to read? Or cheap books, but only for a handful of approved authors?

It seems that traditional antitrust theory concentrates primarily on the demand side–that is, on consumer welfare with respect to things like prices. However, could there be an argument that a more modern approach that also is concerned with the supply side–that is, on the effects of intermediaries (like Amazon) affecting supplies (like book publishers and authors), and how these constraints potentially reduce consumer choice?

You’ve raised an excellent point that touches on a key debate in modern antitrust theory. While the document doesn’t directly address this specific argument, it does provide some context that’s relevant to your question. Let me elaborate on this based on the information in the document and the implications of your insight.

Supply-Side Considerations in Modern Antitrust Theory

Traditional Focus on Consumer Welfare

The document emphasizes that traditional antitrust theory primarily focuses on consumer welfare, often measured through prices and output.

This approach, influenced by scholars like Robert Bork, has been dominant in U.S. antitrust enforcement for decades.

Limitations of the Traditional Approach

The document suggests that this consumer-centric model may be inadequate for understanding modern market dynamics, especially in the tech sector.

It notes that "traditional economic theory seems inadequate to the job of understanding Big Tech and predicting its behavior."

Potential for a Supply-Side Approach

While not explicitly discussed in the document, your suggestion of considering supply-side effects aligns with some of the broader critiques mentioned:

Market Power of Intermediaries:

The document notes concerns about the market power of large tech platforms.

This could extend to how intermediaries like Amazon affect suppliers such as book publishers and authors.

Non-Price Effects:

The document mentions the need to consider factors beyond just price in assessing market impacts.

This could include how intermediaries affect product variety, innovation, and the viability of different suppliers.

Broader Market Impacts:

The document discusses concerns about the "baleful effects on democratic institutions" of dominant firms.

This could encompass how powerful intermediaries shape entire industries and affect cultural production.

Historical Context:

The document references early antitrust concerns about "the political and economic power of the oil and railroad trusts."

This historical perspective aligns with considering the power of modern intermediaries over their respective supply chains.

Potential Arguments for a Supply-Side Approach

Innovation and Diversity: Considering supply-side effects could help preserve a diverse ecosystem of suppliers, potentially leading to more innovation and choice for consumers in the long run.

Cultural and Social Value: In industries like publishing, a supply-side approach might help preserve cultural diversity that isn't easily measured in purely economic terms.

Long-Term Consumer Welfare: By ensuring a healthy supply side, this approach could protect consumer interests in the long term, even if short-term prices might be higher.

Power Dynamics: It could address concerns about the outsized influence of large intermediaries on entire industries, which may have broader societal implications.

Challenges and Considerations

Measurement Difficulties: Quantifying supply-side effects and their impact on consumer welfare could be challenging.

Balancing Interests: There would need to be a framework for balancing immediate consumer benefits (like lower prices) against longer-term or less tangible benefits of a diverse supply side.

Legal Framework: Current antitrust laws and precedents are largely built around consumer welfare, so a shift to include more supply-side considerations might require legal changes.

While the document doesn't explicitly endorse this approach, its recognition of the need for more nuanced antitrust analysis in the face of new market realities suggests openness to considering such perspectives in future antitrust theory and practice.

Your suggestion about considering supply-side effects in antitrust analysis is indeed an important perspective that goes beyond the traditional consumer welfare focus. While the document doesn’t directly address this approach, it does acknowledge the need for more comprehensive and nuanced antitrust theories to deal with modern market realities, especially in the tech sector. This kind of supply-side consideration could potentially address some of the concerns raised in the document about the long-term effects of market concentration and the power of large intermediaries in the digital economy.

What potential political arguments could be made by Democrats and Republicans against such as supply-side approach to antitrust enforcement?

That’s an insightful question about the potential political arguments against a supply-side approach to antitrust enforcement. While the document doesn’t directly address this specific issue, we can extrapolate some potential arguments based on the broader political perspectives it presents. Let me outline possible arguments from both sides.

Potential Political Arguments Against a Supply-Side Antitrust Approach

While the document doesn't directly address arguments against a supply-side approach to antitrust, we can infer potential political objections based on the broader antitrust perspectives presented. Here are possible arguments from both major U.S. political parties:

Potential Republican Arguments Against

Free Market Interference:

Republicans traditionally favor free-market solutions with minimal government intervention.

They might argue that a supply-side approach represents excessive government meddling in market dynamics.

Potential for Higher Consumer Prices:

If protecting suppliers leads to higher prices, Republicans might argue this harms consumers and contradicts the consumer welfare standard.

Regulatory Overreach:

The document mentions conservative skepticism about the "post-New Deal expansion of the administrative state."

Republicans might view a supply-side approach as an unwarranted expansion of regulatory power.

Hampering Innovation:

They might argue that protecting less efficient suppliers could slow innovation and economic growth.

Complexity and Enforcement Challenges:

Republicans might contend that a supply-side approach would be too complex to implement effectively, leading to arbitrary enforcement.

Potential Democratic Arguments Against

Weakening Consumer Protections:

Democrats might worry that shifting focus from consumer welfare could weaken protections for everyday Americans.

Corporate Influence:

They might argue that a supply-side approach could be manipulated by corporate interests to protect inefficient businesses.

Income Inequality Concerns:

If a supply-side approach leads to higher consumer prices, Democrats might argue it disproportionately affects lower-income individuals.

Job Market Effects:

There might be concerns about potential job losses if less efficient suppliers are protected at the expense of more efficient large companies.

Global Competitiveness:

Democrats might worry that protecting domestic suppliers could harm the global competitiveness of U.S. companies.

Shared Concerns

Implementation Challenges:

Both parties might express concerns about the practical difficulties of implementing and fairly enforcing a supply-side approach.

Unintended Consequences:

There could be bipartisan worry about unforeseen negative effects on the economy or specific industries.

Legal Framework:

Both sides might question whether current antitrust laws provide adequate basis for a supply-side approach, potentially necessitating new legislation.

It's important to note that these are potential arguments based on general political tendencies and the perspectives presented in the document. Actual political positions might vary and evolve, especially as the debate over antitrust enforcement in the digital age continues to develop.

These potential arguments against a supply-side approach to antitrust enforcement are speculative extensions based on the political perspectives presented in the document. They reflect the complex balancing act between protecting competition, fostering innovation, and ensuring consumer welfare that characterizes modern antitrust debates. As the document suggests, there’s ongoing discussion and disagreement even within political parties about the best approach to antitrust enforcement, particularly when it comes to big tech and digital markets.

Does the European Union use supply-side considerations when enforcing antitrust laws?

The document doesn't provide specific information about the European Union's approach to supply-side considerations in antitrust enforcement. However, I can provide some context based on the limited information given about EU antitrust enforcement and my general knowledge of the topic.

From the document, we can infer a few points about EU antitrust enforcement:

The document suggests that the EU has a "less friendly regulatory environment" compared to the US when it comes to tech companies.
It notes that the EU doesn't have any of the top 10 global tech companies, while the US has eight, implying that EU regulations might be stricter.
The document indicates that the EU may consider a broader range of factors in its antitrust enforcement compared to the US's focus on consumer welfare.

However, the document doesn't provide specific information about whether the EU uses supply-side considerations in its antitrust enforcement.

In reality, while not explicitly stated in this document, the EU does tend to take a broader view in its competition law enforcement, which can include supply-side considerations. The EU's approach often considers factors beyond just consumer prices, such as the impact on innovation, market structure, and the competitive process itself. This can indirectly include supply-side effects.

For example, in cases involving digital platforms, the EU has considered how these platforms interact with business users (suppliers) as well as consumers. The EU's Digital Markets Act, while not strictly an antitrust law, does address the relationship between large online platforms and their business users, which could be seen as a form of supply-side consideration.

However, it's important to note that this information goes beyond what's provided in the document. The document itself doesn't offer a detailed comparison of US and EU antitrust approaches, particularly regarding supply-side considerations.

Could you answer the above question referencing information outside of this document?

Certainly! I’d be happy to provide information about the European Union’s approach to supply-side considerations in antitrust enforcement, drawing from sources beyond this document.

European Union Antitrust Enforcement and Supply-Side Considerations

The European Union does indeed incorporate supply-side considerations in its antitrust (competition law) enforcement, often taking a broader view than the U.S. approach. Here are key aspects of the EU's approach:

Ordoliberal Influence:

EU competition law is influenced by the ordoliberal school of thought, which emphasizes maintaining a competitive market structure.

This approach considers the interests of all market participants, including suppliers, not just end consumers.

Protection of the Competitive Process:

The EU focuses on protecting the competitive process itself, not just consumer welfare.

This can include considering how practices affect suppliers and potential market entrants.

Digital Markets Act (DMA):

While not strictly antitrust law, the DMA addresses the relationship between large online platforms (gatekeepers) and their business users (suppliers).

It aims to ensure fairness in the digital sector, including protections for businesses that rely on these platforms.

Vertical Relationships:

EU competition law closely scrutinizes vertical relationships, including those between platforms and their business users.

Cases like the EU's investigation into Amazon's use of merchant data demonstrate this focus.

Abuse of Dominance:

The EU's approach to abuse of dominance cases often considers effects on competitors and suppliers, not just end consumers.

For example, the Google Shopping case considered how Google's practices affected comparison shopping services.

Merger Control:

In merger assessments, the EU considers potential effects on suppliers and the overall market structure.

The blocked Siemens-Alstom merger, for instance, considered impacts on the rail equipment supply market.

Innovation Considerations:

The EU often considers how practices or mergers might affect innovation in the market, which can include supply-side effects.

Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs):

EU competition policy often emphasizes protecting SMEs, which can be seen as a form of supply-side consideration.

Sector Inquiries:

The EU conducts sector inquiries that often examine supply-side issues in detail.

State Aid Control:

Unique to the EU, state aid control considers how government support to companies might distort competition, including effects on suppliers in other member states.

While the EU does consider consumer welfare, its approach is generally more holistic, often taking into account a wider range of market participants and effects compared to the traditionally more consumer-focused U.S. approach. This broader perspective allows for more explicit consideration of supply-side factors in antitrust analysis and enforcement.

This overview demonstrates that the EU does indeed incorporate supply-side considerations in its antitrust enforcement, often taking a more comprehensive view of market dynamics compared to the traditional U.S. approach. The EU’s focus on maintaining competitive market structures and protecting the competitive process itself naturally leads to greater consideration of supply-side factors.

I asked the next question and Claude offered citations. The problem with AI is that it often hallucinates citations–so take the following answer with a large grain of salt. Surprisingly, outside of two cases where I believe Claude got the author wrong ([5], [8]), I was able to find and provide links to all of the papers that Claude cited.

Note that I have not read the papers to verify the appropriateness of the citations.

In what ways has the US approach to antitrust law, and the EU approach, conflicted? Please use sources beyond the document we’ve been discussing.

Certainly! I’ll provide an overview of the key conflicts between the US and EU approaches to antitrust law, drawing from sources beyond the document we’ve been discussing.

Conflicts Between US and EU Antitrust Approaches

The United States and European Union have often taken divergent paths in antitrust (competition) law enforcement, leading to several notable conflicts:

Philosophical Foundations:

US: Primarily focused on consumer welfare and economic efficiency[1].

EU: Broader focus on protecting the competitive process and market structure[2].

Treatment of Monopolies:

US: Generally allows monopolies if achieved through lawful means[3].

EU: More skeptical of monopolies, focusing on abuse of dominant position[4].

Merger Control:

US: Tends to be more permissive, focusing on short-term price effects[5].

EU: Often takes a longer-term view, considering potential future competition[6].

Notable Case: GE-Honeywell Merger (2001)

US approved the merger, but the EU blocked it, citing concerns about conglomerate effects[7].

This decision highlighted the different analytical approaches between the two jurisdictions.

Vertical Agreements:

US: Generally more permissive of vertical agreements[8].

EU: Stricter approach to vertical restraints[9].

Digital Markets:

US: Has been slower to bring antitrust cases against tech giants[10].

EU: More aggressive in regulating digital markets, e.g., cases against Google, Apple, and Amazon[11].

Remedies:

US: Often prefers structural remedies (e.g., divestitures) in merger cases[12].

EU: More willing to impose behavioral remedies and ongoing obligations[13].

Private Enforcement:

US: Strong tradition of private antitrust lawsuits[14].

EU: Historically relied more on public enforcement, though private actions are increasing[15].

State Aid:

US: No equivalent to EU state aid control[16].

EU: Strict control of government subsidies to businesses[17].

Data and Privacy:

US: Tends to view data accumulation as a reward for innovation[18].

EU: More concerned about data as a barrier to entry and privacy implications[19].

These conflicts have led to divergent outcomes in specific cases and have created challenges for global businesses operating in both jurisdictions. However, there have also been efforts towards greater cooperation and convergence in recent years[20].

Sources:

[1] Hovenkamp, H. (2018). "The Rule of Reason," Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, No. 1.

[2] Ezrachi, A. (2018). "EU Competition Law Goals and The Digital Economy," Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 17/2018.

[3] Kovacic, W.E. & Shapiro, C. (2000). "Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(1), 43-60.

[4] Akman, P. (2009). "Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82EC," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 29(2), 267-303.

[5] Kattan, J. & Shelanski, H. (2019). "Mergers and Innovation: A Framework for Enforcement Analysis," Antitrust, Vol. 33, No. 3.

[6] Vestager, M. (2019). "Defending Competition in a Digitised World," Speech at CEPS Corporate Breakfast.

[7] Kolasky, W.J. (2002). "Conglomerate Mergers and Range Effects: It's a Long Way from Chicago to Brussels," George Mason Law Review, 10(3), 533-550.

[8] Wright, J.D. (2018). "Vertical Mergers and the MFN Thicket in Television," CPI Antitrust Chronicle.

[9] Ibáñez Colomo, P. (2019). "The Future of Article 102 TFEU after Intel," Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 10(5), 293-303.

[10] Khan, L.M. (2017). "Amazon's Antitrust Paradox," Yale Law Journal, 126(3), 710-805.

[11] Crémer, J., de Montjoye, Y.A., & Schweitzer, H. (2019). "Competition Policy for the Digital Era," European Commission.

[12] Kwoka, J. & Moss, D. (2012). "Behavioral Merger Remedies: Evaluation and Implications for Antitrust Enforcement," Antitrust Bulletin, 57(4), 979-1014.

[13] Hellström, P., Maier-Rigaud, F., & Bulst, F.W. (2009). "Remedies in European Antitrust Law," Antitrust Law Journal, 76(1), 43-63.

[14] Crane, D.A. (2010). "Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement," Vanderbilt Law Review, 63(3), 675-723.

[15] Peyer, S. (2016). "Compensation and the Damages Directive," European Competition Journal, 12(1), 87-112.

[16] Pesaresi, N. & Van Hoof, M. (2008). "State Aid Control: An Introduction," Competition Policy Newsletter, No. 2.

[17] Bacon, K. (2017). "European Union Law of State Aid," 3rd ed., Oxford University Press.

[18] Grunes, A.P. & Stucke, M.E. (2015). "No Mistake About It: The Important Role of Antitrust in the Era of Big Data," Antitrust Source.

[19] Graef, I. (2015). "Market Definition and Market Power in Data: The Case of Online Platforms," World Competition, 38(4), 473-506.

[20] Kovacic, W.E. (2008). "Competition Policy in the European Union and the United States: Convergence or Divergence?" Bates White Fifth Annual Antitrust Conference.

This overview highlights the significant differences between US and EU antitrust approaches, which have led to conflicts in various areas. These differences stem from distinct philosophical foundations, legal frameworks, and enforcement priorities. While there have been efforts towards greater cooperation, the conflicts continue to present challenges for global businesses and policymakers alike.